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Internationally Coordinated Emission Permit 






This paper investigates the welfare costs of unilateral versus internationally coordinated 
emission permit policies in a two-country overlapping generations model with producer 
carbon emissions. We show that, for a net foreign debtor country, the domestic welfare costs 
of a unilateral domestic permit policy are larger than of an internationally coordinated policy 
if the world economy is dynamically efficient. From the perspective of a net foreign debtor 
country that has withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol, an internationally coordinated permit 
policy is dominated by climate political inaction also in the post-Kyoto era since bearing the 
costs of foreign actionism is cheaper, in terms of welfare, than agreeing on international 
policy coordination - unless the world economy becomes dynamically inefficient. 
JEL Code: Q52, Q54, D91. 
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After Australia’s ratiﬁcation of the Kyoto Protocol in 2008, the US was the only
OECD country rejecting to ratify the Protocol. As is well known from the literature,
the US withdrawal from this international agreement in 2001 has been informed by
three major concerns: reduced international competitiveness, lack of developing
countries participation (particularly China and India), and lagging public support
for climate policy (see, e.g. Selin and VanDeveer, 2007; Weber and Peters, 2009).
Despite the ongoing scepticism towards any international Post–Kyoto agreement,
the Lieberman–Warner bill, also known as Americas’s Climate Security Act (ACSA),
passed the US Senate in late June 2009. This can be regarded as a ﬁrst credible
step towards domestic climate policy in the United States, and as a prerequisite for
internationally coordinated climate policy in the future (Bang et al., 2007; Weber
and Peters, 2009).
It is therefore of key relevance to global climate policy negotiations to identify argu-
ments for the US that favor their participation in a Post–Kyoto agreement. Apart
from concerns about competitiveness, developing countries’ participation and public
support, a useful, but often neglected, leverage for international climate policy is
international trade (Weber and Peters, 2009): since the US is the world’s largest
importer and the second largest exporter, and since moreover the US is a large net
foreign debtor to the world economy, any domestic and any foreign climate policy
(at least of large trading partners like the European Union) has an eﬀect on terms
of trade, domestic and international prices, output (GDP), and thus the economy’s
welfare.
In this paper, we study in a stylized theoretical model the consequences of unilateral
foreign climate policy for welfare of a country like the US which has not implemented
domestic climate policy yet. Extending Ono’s (2002) closed economy model, we use
a two–good, two–country overlapping generations’ model with producer greenhouse
gas emissions and domestic permit systems. In order to be able to highlight the
2eﬀects triggered by international trade in commodities as well as by the external
balance of the involved countries, we model the countries as perfectly symmetric in
terms of preferences and endowments, but slightly diﬀerentiated in terms of technol-
ogy. The domestic country is assumed to be a net debtor while the foreign country
is a net creditor to the world economy. Accordingly, the domestic country can be
regarded as representing the US and the foreign country as the EU.
To single out the inﬂuence of the external balance of the involved countries and
the dynamic (in)eﬃciency of the world economy, our analysis proceeds in two steps.
We start by comparing the domestic welfare costs of a unilateral permit policy
abroad to those of an internationally coordinated policy in order to see whether
the domestic country is interested to reconsider its withdrawal by either deciding
for unilateral permit reduction or agreeing on an internationally coordinated permit
reduction. For that purpose, we derive the domestic and foreign welfare costs of
climate policy, namely a unilateral reduction of the level of emission permits in either
of the countries, following the approach taken for ﬁscal policy by Persson (1985).
Secondly, we show from the perspective of a net foreign debtor country which has
withdrawn from the Protocol under which conditions continual withdrawal is to be
preferred to the consequences of climate political coordination.
Our paper contributes to the theoretical literature on the welfare consequences of
unilateral and internationally coordinated climate policy by highlighting the role
of a country’s external balance (i.e., the net foreign asset position) and the dy-
namic (in)eﬃciency of the world economy. The early literature after the unilateral
ﬁscal expansion in the United States in the 1980s aimed to understand the interna-
tional consequences of unilateral ﬁscal policy among highly developed nations. This
literature concluded that unilateral ﬁscal expansion reduces capital accumulation
domestically and abroad (Lipton and Sachs, 1983) and that the terms of trade con-
sequences depend on the external balance of the debt expanding country (Frenkel
and Razin, 1986). As regards welfare eﬀects of a unilateral expansion of public
debt, the literature points to diﬀerences in the external balance and the dynamic
3(in)eﬃciency of the world economy. Persson (1985) ﬁnds that the domestic welfare
costs are lower (or turn even to a welfare gain) when the more indebted country
is a net foreign creditor given that the world economy is dynamically eﬃcient. In
particular, crowding out of private capital at home and abroad increases the world-
wide real interest rate, which in turn aﬀects the welfare of international debtors and
creditors diﬀerently.
While many communalities can be found among the factors determining the welfare
cost of ﬁscal policy and of unilateral climate policy, there is a remarkable diﬀerence
regarding the impact on the terms of trade. Given that the countries are similar
in terms of technology, ﬁscal policy does not aﬀect the terms of trade of domestic
exports and hence welfare is not aﬀected through this channel (Farmer and Friedl,
forthcoming). On the other hand, unilateral climate policy reduces production in
the policy implementing country since greenhouse gas emissions are an indispensable
production factor. The terms of trade of domestic exports improve and hence this
positive eﬀect on welfare counteracts the welfare cost through the output channel
(in a static context, see Copeland and Taylor, 2005).
The main ﬁnding of this paper is that there is much welfare economic rationale
for the climate political reluctance of net foreign debtor countries (like the United
States) under dynamic eﬃciency (including the Golden Rule) of the world economy
as well as for the eﬀort put into Post–Kyoto negotiations on behalf of Kyoto com-
plying countries (like the European Union). The disincentive provided by the higher
welfare costs of a unilateral domestic climate policy compared to those of a unilateral
climate policy abroad can contribute to the explanation of the withdrawal from the
Kyoto Protocol. Secondly, for the Post–Kyoto era, internationally coordinated poli-
cies are still associated with higher domestic welfare costs than a unilateral foreign
policy, despite the international interdependence of large economies. By a similar
argument, the unilateral domestic policy is associated with higher welfare costs for
Kyoto–complying countries than an internationally coordinated policy. Thus, Kyoto
complying countries might have an welfare economic incentive to renegotiate with
4withdrawers to get them back on board.
This paper has ﬁve sections. In the next section we provide a description of the
two–country, two–good model with nationally tradable emission permits. This will
be followed by the derivation of the intertemporal equilibrium dynamics, existence
and stability of steady state solutions in Section 3, and by the investigation of the
steady state eﬀects, caused by the reduction in the permit volume in one country,
on the terms of trade, and on domestic and foreign capital accumulation. Section 4
is devoted to a thorough analysis and comparison of welfare costs of unilateral and
internationally coordinated policies. Section 5 summarizes our results and concludes.
2 The basic model
Consider an inﬁnite–horizon world economy of two countries, Home H and Foreign
F, which have the same population normalized to unity. Each country is composed
of perfectly competitive ﬁrms and ﬁnitely lived consumers. The countries diﬀer in
their levels of public debt per capita, leading to diverging net foreign asset positions
across countries. This assumption is essential for the emergence of international
trade in a large open economy framework.
There are two tradeable goods, x and y∗, and each country specializes in the pro-
duction of a unique good, which can be used for the purpose of consumption in
both countries as well as for investment.1 Both goods are produced by employing
labor and capital, and both cause a ﬂow of pollution. Households save in terms
of internationally immobile capital and internationally mobile government bonds,
where the supply of government bonds in each country is constant over time (as in
Diamond, 1965). Without loss of generality, the rate of depreciation can be set at
1This assumption is a deviation of our model from the assumptions of the Heckscher–Ohlin
model. Our model can be regarded as an OLG analoguous to Obstfeld’s (1989) and Gosh’s (1992)
two–good, two–country ILA models.
5one, enabling investment of the current period to form next period’s capital stock.
Regarding greenhouse gas emissions and climate policy, we follow the established
approach in closed economy OLG models (Ono, 2002; Jouvet et al., 2005a,b; Br´ echet
et al., 2009) and focus on emissions from production that are regulated by an emis-
sions permit trading system. Our model provides an open economy extension of
these closed economy models and can thereby be used to analyze not only domestic
eﬀects but also international feedback eﬀects of permit policies. We further assume
that any production process causes pollution and that therefore each country imple-
ments a domestic emissions trading system with an exogenously set cap on domestic
carbon emissions.2
2.1 Firms and the permit markets
Let the domestically produced good be x and the foreign–produced good be y⋆,
both in per capita terms (in the following, all foreign–country variables are denoted
by a superscript asterisk). Countries Home and Foreign are assumed to have the
same Cobb–Douglas constant–returns–to–scale production technology in per capita
terms:













where M denotes a productivity scalar, kt (k⋆
t) and pt (p⋆
t) are respectively the
capital–labor ratio and the pollution–labor ratio in H (F).3
To incorporate unilateral and internationally coordinated climate policy, we assume
2Alternatively, one could model a global emissions trading system, which would lead to equal
permit prices across countries. Another possibility would be to assume that goods consumed
domestically (rather than those produced) fall under the permit trading scheme.
3Ono (2002, 77) shows how, by rescaling parameters, a production function exhibiting constant
returns to scale with respect to labor and capital, and with emission intensity as a scaling factor,
can be transformed into a three–factor constant returns to scale production function with labor,
capital and pollution as inputs.
6that in each country and each period, the long–lived government sets an emissions
cap and assigns corresponding emission permits to the production sector. This total
number of emission permits is denoted by S in Home and by S⋆ in Foreign. Following
the speciﬁcation of the permit market in Ono (2002), emission permits are initially
distributed free of charge to the ﬁrms. If a ﬁrm’s emissions exceed its allowance,
then it buys emission permits in the domestic permit market, while for the opposite
case it sells excess permits. International trade in emission permits is precluded.
In each period, ﬁrms in Home (and analogously for Foreign) choose k and p to
maximize proﬁt πt = xt − qtkt − wt + et (S − pt), where qt (q⋆
t) is the rental price of
capital, wt (w⋆
t) is the wage rate, and et (e⋆
t) is the permit price in Home (Foreign).
As described above, emission permits are traded in a perfectly competitive market.
Since, moreover, ﬁrms rent capital and employ labor in perfect factor markets, the



































Proﬁt maximization implies that the ﬁrm’s revenues net of the payments to produc-
tion factors give a proﬁt equal to the initial endowment of permits, etS. This proﬁt
is collected by the government and reimbursed to the young households.4
2.2 Households and governments
Each country is inhabited by identical consumers which live for two periods, one
working and one retirement period. The representative consumer’s intertemporal
utility depends on consumption during the working period, composed of the con-
sumption goods of both countries, x1
t and y1
t, and consumption during the retirement
period, x2
t+1 and y2
t+1. For simplicity, the representative households of countries H
4In essence, this particular modeling of the permit system guarantees that the subsidy is non–
distortionary and that permits are not “grandfathered”.
7and F are assumed to have identical preferences across goods (0 < ζ < 1) and over
time (0 < β < 1) and are represented by a log–linear intertemporal utility function:
Ut = ζ lnx
1













t = ζ lnx
⋆,1











Note that utility is independent of greenhouse gas emissions since households are
short lived and it is reasonable to assume that they do not care for the beneﬁts of
delayed climate change in the distant future in response to reduced emissions today.
Consequently, any change in lifetime utility of the households can be regarded as a
welfare cost which deﬁnes a threshold value for the social beneﬁt of delayed climate
change.
In maximizing intertemporal utility (2), the domestic household is constrained by
a budget constraint in each period of life. When young, wage income wt, net of a
lump–sum tax τt imposed by the national government, is spent on consumption of
the domestic and the imported good, with ht denoting the terms of trade of Home
(units of Foreign good per unit of Home good). Furthermore, for transferring income
to their retirement period, young households save in terms of domestic capital kt+1
and in terms of bonds of Home bH
t+1 and of Foreign b
⋆,H
t+1. From saving, the old
household gains interest income, where it+1 and i⋆
t+1 denote the interest rates in
Home and Foreign. When old, the household spends interest income and capital on
consumption, again for the Home and Foreign good (x2
t+1 and y2
t+1, respectively).








t + st = wt − τt, (3)
where savings are deﬁned as st ≡ kt+1+bH
t+1+(1/ht)b
⋆,H
t+1. The corresponding budget

















t+1. After taking account of the no–arbitrage condition
of the asset market in each country














































+ ht+1 (1 + it+1)b
F
t+1. (5⋆)
Maximizing (2) subject to (3) and (5), and (2⋆) subject to (3⋆) and (5⋆) gives the






































































Utility maximizing domestic and foreign savings are then given by
st = σ (wt − τt), s
∗








As mentioned above, the government runs a “constant–stock” ﬁscal policy and thus
bt+1 = bt = b,∀t, and b∗
t+1 = b∗
t = b∗,∀t, respectively (as in Diamond, 1965). Then,










t , ∀t. (9)
The budget constraints for Home and Foreign governments require that revenues
from tax income and permit trading have to balance with interest payments to the
bond holders:









2.3 Market clearing and international trade







= (1 + it+1), ∀t. (11)
9Clearing of Home’s product market requires that domestic supply balances with













t , ∀t, (12)

















where the optimal consumption quantities are given from (6)–(7⋆).
Clearing of the world asset market requires the supply of savings to be equal to the















This equation thus relates the terms of trade movements to capital accumulation
and to the levels of domestic and foreign debt. Rearranging gives the following
relationship between Home’s terms of trade and the net foreign asset positions of
Foreign (φ∗
t+1) and Home (φt+1):
ht = −
k∗
t+1 + b∗ − s∗
t






Since ht > 0, either φt+1 > 0 and consequently φ∗
t+1 < 0, Home is a net debtor and
Foreign a net creditor, or φt+1 < 0 and φ∗
t+1 > 0 which means that Home is a net
creditor and Foreign a net debtor.
3 Steady state eﬀects of unilateral or internation-
ally coordinated permit policy
In this section, we ﬁrst present the dynamic equations describing the intertemporal
equilibrium of our two–country, two–good model before deriving the steady state
and the eﬀects of unilateral permit polices on the steady state.
103.1 Intertemporal equilibrium dynamics
Acknowledging the market clearing for the permit market in Home (pt = S,∀t),
and substituting for the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order conditions (1) yields an expression for
st which depends only on kt and exogenously given parameters, and similarly for
s∗
t. By inserting these optimal savings functions into the international asset market
clearing condition (13), we obtain the second equation of motion:
htkt+1 + k
∗
t+1 = ht [σ0 (kt)








t + 1), (14)
where σ0 ≡ (1 − αK)σMSαP and σ∗




Multiplying the national product market clearing condition of Home (12) by ht and
the one of Foreign (12⋆) by ζ/(1−ζ), inserting optimal consumptions of households
in Home and Foreign (6)–(7⋆), and subtracting the second from the ﬁrst gives the



















Considering the no–arbitrage conditions for national asset markets (4), and the ﬁrms’
ﬁrst order conditions (1) and (1⋆) in the international interest parity condition (11),




















The dynamic system for the terms of trade, ht, and for the (per capita) capital stocks
in Home and Foreign (kt+1 and k∗
t+1 respectively) are thus described by Equations
(14), (15), and (16).
3.2 Characterisation of steady states











11Under the presumption of parameter sets which ensure the existence of at least
one non–trivial steady state, these dynamic equations can be reduced to a system of
three equations which determine the endogenous variables k, h and k∗. According to
(14), the geometrical locus of all pairs (k,h) which assure international asset market










P σ ((1 − α∗
K)k∗ − b∗α∗
K) + (1 − σ)b∗
 
 
k − M (k)
αK−1 (S)
αP σ ((1 − αK)k − bαK) + (1 − σ)b
  , (17)
and, following from (15), the equilibrium condition for the combined product market



















































Figure 1: The KK-curves (black) and GG-curves (gray) for φ > 0 (left), and φ < 0
(right).
A steady state general equilibrium occurs when the KK–curve and the GG–curve
intersect in the ﬁrst quadrant. For identical production elasticities across countries,
αK = α∗
K and αP = α∗
P, Figure 1 depicts two typical conﬁgurations of KK- and
GG-curves. Inspection of the slopes reveals that the KK-curve is U–shaped if φ < 0
and inverted U–shaped if φ > 0. The GG-curve is due to assumption of identical
technologies horizontal. The existence of two non–trivial steady states, kL and kH,
is proven in Appendix A.1.
12Being assured of the existence of two distinct steady–state solutions, the next step
is to investigate the local stability of the two steady states. For the parameter sets
underlying Figure 1, the calculation of the Jacobian matrix of the dynamic system
in the two steady states indicates that in the steady state with the lower capital
intensity (kL) two eigenvalues are larger and one is less than unity, while in the
steady state with the higher capital intensity (kH) one eigenvalue is larger and two
are less than unity (for the formal proof, see Farmer et al., 2008, 29–31). Thus, the
former steady state is saddle path unstable while the latter is saddle path stable. In
Figure 1, this stable steady state associated with the higher capital intensity kH can
be found as the second point of intersection of the GG– and KK–curve (for both
cases). Due to the algebraic complexity of the Jacobian of the equilibrium dynamics
around the steady states, the stability of the steady states can be proven only for
small diﬀerences between αK and α∗
K (see Appendix A.2).
3.3 Steady state eﬀects of diﬀerent permit policies
Knowing that the steady state associated with kH qualiﬁes as being locally stable,
we can now turn to the investigation of the long–run eﬀects of a unilateral permit
reduction on the main variables of our model. To pursue this objective, we assume
that either Home implements a more stringent permit policy (dS < 0) while the
permit policy of Foreign remains unchanged at S∗. Alternatively, Foreign could im-
plement a permit policy (dS⋆ < 0) while Home’s permit policy remains unchanged.
As a third case, we investigate the steady state eﬀects of an internationally coor-
dinated permit policy in which both countries implement permit policies, assuming
that they reduce in total as much as one country would reduce unilaterally. We
further assume that the shock is unannounced and permanent such that the house-
holds and ﬁrms cannot act anticipatory prior to the shock (e.g., by adjusting their
saving decision). Furthermore, to keep the analysis tractable, we assume from now
on equal production elasticities countries, i.e. αK = α∗
K and αP = α∗
P.
13To determine the eﬀects of a marginal unilateral reduction of emission permits on the
three dynamic variables, we totally diﬀerentiate (17), (18), and (19), with respect
to S and S∗. The comparative steady state eﬀects of unilateral permit policies are
given in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Let αK = α∗
K and αP = α∗
P. An inﬁnitesimal change of S and/or






















































(1 − ζ)b∗(1 + σi)
k∗(1 − λ3)






ϑ ≡ (ζb + (1 − ζ)b∗(S/S∗)αP/(1−αK)), and γ > 0,γ∗ > 0 for k = kH.
Proof 1 See Appendix A.3.
For k = kH, and similar technologies across countries, Proposition 1 states that a
unilateral permit policy leads to a decline in both the equilibrium values of k and
k⋆, but with a stronger domestic eﬀect than abroad (1 +γ > γ∗). Thus, in contrast
to a closed economy, international trade causes a spillover eﬀect on foreign capital
accumulation—the permit reducing country crowds out capital not only domesti-
cally but also abroad. The reason why crowding out occurs in both countries is that
interest parity across countries is required by (19): Since the decline in the domestic
capital stock increases the domestic interest rate, the foreign interest rate has to
increase too which leads to a decline in the foreign capital stock. Furthermore, and
due to the assumption of two large economies, the permit reducing country experi-
ences an improvement in her terms of trade because domestic prices rise relative to
foreign prices.5
5This can also be seen from (18) where a reduction in S leads to an improvement of the terms
of trade. Thus, the foreign good in units of the domestic good becomes cheaper.
14Corollary 1 applies Proposition 1 to the case of internationally coordinated climate
policy. To be able to compare the coordinated to the unilateral policies, we assume
that the total level of permit reduction is ﬁxed worldwide and that under an interna-
tionally coordinated policy Home reduced at a share of d¯ S = δdS and Foreign at a
share of d ¯ S⋆ = (1−δ)dS⋆. As stated formally in Corollary 1, under the assumption
that both countries implement an equally strong permit reduction (i.e. dS = dS⋆
and δ = 1/2), the terms of trade eﬀect vanishes and the capital stock eﬀects are
symmetric for both countries.
Corollary 1 Let αK = α∗
K and αP = α∗
P and S = S∗. Suppose that both countries
implement a permit policy such that d¯ S = δdS, d ¯ S⋆ = (1−δ)dS⋆, where dS = dS⋆,
0 < δ < 1 and δ = 1/2. A simultaneously inﬁnitesimal change of S and S∗ leads to
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Knowing that a unilateral policy leads both to a positive domestic (and a negative
foreign) terms of trade eﬀect and to a negative capital stock eﬀect while an interna-
tionally coordinated policy impacts only on capital accumulation, the next step is
to investigate the welfare costs of these steady state eﬀects. The purpose of the next
section is is to investigate the welfare consequences of unilateral versus internation-
ally coordinated permit policies taking account of the net foreign asset position of
the countries and the dynamic eﬃciency (ineﬃciency) of the world economy.
4 The welfare cost of diﬀerent permit policies
The welfare consequences of permit policies are determined by the eﬀect of adjust-
ments in the terms of trade and capital stocks on lifetime utility as deﬁned by (2)
15and (2⋆). Since both utility functions incorporate only consumption of goods but
not environmental quality, any decline in utility can be regarded as the welfare cost
of a permit policy. The higher the welfare cost of unilateral permit policy the lower
is the incentive of a country to perform a unilateral reduction of emission permits
or to agree on an internationally coordinated permit policy.
To analyze the welfare costs of unilateral versus internationally coordinated permit
policies, we proceed in the following way. First, we derive the welfare costs of
unilateral permit policies for the domestic economy, i.e. of a unilateral domestic or
a unilateral foreign permit policy. Secondly, we compare the domestic welfare costs
of a unilateral permit policy and an internationally coordinated permit policy. As
in the previous chapter, our deﬁnition of an internationally coordinated policy is
that both countries implement policies, and that they reduce in total as much as
one country would reduce unilaterally.
4.1 Derivation of welfare changes
To derive the domestic steady state welfare eﬀects of a reduction in S and S⋆,
we deﬁne the indirect intertemporal utility function of Home as U(x1,y1,x2,y2) ≡
V (w − τ,1 + i,h) (from (2) substituting for optimal consumption levels (6)–(7))
and diﬀerentiate it with respect to the dynamic variables. Using the ﬁrst order
conditions of Home’s utility maximization problem, the change in domestic welfare
































































The change in domestic welfare caused by an inﬁnitesimal unilateral domestic permit
reduction dV/dS incorporates both indirect eﬀects of a change in S on the capital
stock and on the terms of trade as well as direct eﬀects of a change in S on factor
prices (w − τ) and (1 + i). Welfare in the non–reducing country dV/dS⋆ is aﬀected
only by the indirect eﬀects of a reduction in S⋆ on the capital stock and the terms
of trade. Regarding the terms of trade eﬀect, we know from the previous section
that the permit reducing country experiences a terms of trade improvement while
the non–reducing country is aﬀected by a terms of trade deterioration (dh/dS > 0
and dh/dS∗ < 0), leading to a welfare improvement in the reducing and to a welfare
deterioration in the non–reducing country.7
To determine the sign of the domestic welfare response caused by unilateral do-
mestic and foreign permit policies, we make again use of the assumption of similar
6To be more precise, the equality sign in (20) and (21) should be substituted for ≈ because







2 + R3(S + dS,S
⋆),
whereby R3(S + dS,S⋆) is the remainder after two terms according to Taylor’s formula (see Syd-
saeter et al., 2005, 77-78). Obviously, we are satisﬁed with a linear approximation, assuming dS
being inﬁnitesimally small.
7In a closed economy context, this type of eﬀect was called by Meade (1952) ‘pecuniary exter-
nality’ to describe a situation where the changed activity level of one agent aﬀects the ﬁnancial
circumstances of another agent due to a change in prices (for a discussion, see Baumol and Oates,
1988, 14–16; 29–30).
17technologies across countries.
Proposition 2 Let αK = α∗
K and αP = α∗
P. Acknowledging that (w − τ) =
(1 − αK)/αK(1 + i)k − i b and φ = k + b − s, the change in domestic welfare









γ [i(k + b) + φ] + ζ
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Depending on the signs of i and φ, three cases emerge:
(i) For φ > 0 (Home is a net foreign debtor), dV/dS > 0 ⇐⇒ i ≥ 0 and dV/dS
⋆ >
0 ⇐⇒ i = 0, while for i > 0 the sign of dV/dS
⋆ is ambiguous.
(ii) For φ < 0 (Home is a net foreign creditor) and i = 0, dV/dS > 0 ⇐⇒
γφ+ζk/αK > 0 and dV/dS
⋆ > 0 ⇐⇒ γ
∗φ+(1−ζ)k/αK > 0, while for i > 0
the signs of dV/dS and of dV/dS
⋆ are ambiguous.
(iii) For i < 0, the signs of dV/dS and dV/dS
⋆ are ambiguous.
Proof 2 See Appendix A.4
Proposition 2 illustrates the importance of the net foreign asset position (φ) and the
dynamic (in)eﬃciency of the world economy (i = i∗ ≥ 0 or i = i∗ < 0). Depending
on whether the permit reducing country is a net debtor or a net creditor to the
world economy, and on whether the steady state interest rate is positive (dynamic
eﬃciency), zero (Golden Rule), or negative (dynamic ineﬃciency), the terms in
(22)–(23) are either unidirectional and hence the welfare cost of a permit reduction
are certainly positive, or some of the terms are positive while others are negative,
leading to an ambiguous welfare eﬀect.
18For the dynamically eﬃcient case (i > 0) or the Golden Rule (i = 0) where Home is
a net foreign debtor (φ > 0), the net welfare eﬀect of a domestic permit reduction is
unambiguously negative. For the opposite case where Home is a net foreign creditor
(φ < 0), however, the net welfare eﬀect can be signed unambiguously negative only
for the case of the Golden Rule, as a special case of dynamic eﬃciency where i = 0,
and if |γφ| is smaller than ζk/αK. Thus, in both cases (i) and (ii) a unilateral
reduction of the permit level leads to welfare costs that have to be outweighed by
environmental beneﬁts for the policy to be approved by the social planner. If in
contrast the interest rate were negative in the initial steady state (dynamic ineﬃ-
ciency) as in case (iii), we cannot rule out the case that dV/dS and dV/dS⋆ becomes
negative and hence welfare improves when the permit level is reduced.
Similarly, the domestic welfare eﬀect of a unilateral permit reduction abroad is un-
ambiguously negative if the Golden Rule applies, regardless of whether the domestic
economy is a net debtor or a net creditor to the world economy. Under dynamic
eﬃciency of the world economy, and also under dynamic eﬃciency, positive and
negative eﬀects prevail such that the domestic welfare eﬀect of a unilateral policy in
either of the countries is ambiguous. We turn next to a comparison of the domestic
welfare cost of a unilateral domestic versus an internationally coordinated permit
policy.
4.2 Comparison of welfare costs of a unilateral domestic and
an internationally coordinated permit policy
To understand why some net foreign debtor countries have withdrawn from the
Kyoto Protocol, we compare the welfare costs of a unilateral permit reduction policy
and of an internationally coordinated policy. To be able to compare those two
policies, we assume that the total level of permit reduction is ﬁxed worldwide and
that either both countries reduce (at a share of 0 < δ < 1 for Home and (1 − δ) for
Foreign, respectively), or one country reduces unilaterally (such that either δ = 1
19or 0 otherwise). Thus, the welfare cost of the unilateral domestic permit policy is
deﬁned as
V (S + dS,S





whereas the welfare cost of the harmonized permit policy is
V (S + δdS,S
⋆ + (1 − δ)dS








Assuming that both countries implement equally stringent unilateral permit policies
and hence δ = (1 − δ) = 1/2, S = S⋆ and dS = dS⋆, the welfare cost of the



























Note that when both countries reduce their permit levels equally, the terms of trade
eﬀect on welfare, which contributes positively to welfare in case of a unilateral
domestic policy (and negatively in case of a unilateral foreign policy), vanishes.
What remains are the welfare reducing eﬀects through the impact on the capital
stock.
Thus, when comparing (24), taking account of (22), with (25′) it is not straight for-
ward to see which policy leads to higher welfare costs. While the unilateral domestic
policy leads to, according to Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, higher reductions in do-
mestic capital accumulation compared to the internationally coordinated policy, the
positive terms of trade eﬀect on welfare is present only under the unilateral but not
under the internationally coordinated policy. Furthermore, knowing that the net
foreign asset position of a country determines whether her unilateral permit policy
dS < 0 causes larger (smaller) domestic than foreign welfare costs, the question
arises whether this relationship pertains also when comparing the domestic welfare
costs of a unilateral domestic and of an internationally coordinated permit policy.
Proposition 3 Let αK = α⋆
K, αP = α⋆
P, ζ = (1 − ζ), S = S∗. Suppose that either
Home implements a permit policy dS < 0 or both countries implement a permit
20policy such that d¯ S = δdS, d ¯ S⋆ = (1 − δ)dS⋆, where dS = dS⋆, 0 < δ < 1 and
δ = 1/2. Then, the diﬀerence in the domestic welfare costs of a domestic unilateral
permit policy and an internationally coordinated permit policy is given by


























Depending on the signs of i and φ, three cases emerge:









(ii) For i = i⋆ = 0 (Golden Rule) and φ < 0, V (S+dS,S⋆) < V
 
S + dS




(iii) For i < 0 (dynamic ineﬃciency), the sign of V (S+dS,S⋆)−V
 
S + dS




Proof 3 To derive (26), we subtract (25′) from (24) and utilize (23) and (22).
Case i: Since φ > 0 and φ = (1 + σi)(1 − ζ)(b − b∗), b > b∗ which implies that
γ − γ
∗ =
(1 + σi)ζ(b − b∗)
k(1 − λ3)
> 0. With i > 0, V (S +dS,S⋆) < V
 
S + dS






















Thus, Proposition 3 demonstrates that irrespective of the net foreign asset posi-
tion of a country, it is beneﬁcial for Home in terms of her welfare costs to achieve
an internationally coordinated permit policy instead of a unilateral domestic, given
that in case of a net creditor country the Golden Rule applies. If, in contrast, dy-
namic ineﬃciency holds in the initial steady state, the sign of V
 
S + dS




V (S,S⋆ + dS⋆) is ambiguous. Eventually, Home’s unilateral policy might thus lead
to lower domestic welfare losses than a harmonized policy. For numerical values of
21policy parameters which imply that Home is a net foreign creditor like the European
Union and that the world economy is either dynamically eﬃcient or ineﬃcient, the
welfare costs of unilateral domestic permit policy can become lower than the welfare
costs of internationally coordinated permit policy. Three main channels cause this
counter–intuitive result: compared to the unilateral domestic policy, the terms of
trade eﬀect of an internationally coordinated policy vanishes; secondly, the crowd-
ing out eﬀect on domestic capital accumulation is ameliorated (and a considerable
fraction is shifted abroad); and thirdly, the permit prices rise equally in both coun-
tries rather than the price diﬀerential caused by a unilateral policy. Under such
circumstances, and assuming that a country can either implement a unilateral per-
mit policy herself or bear the consequences of an internationally coordinated policy,
a net creditor country like the European Union might prefer to go ahead alone by
implementing a unilateral policy rather than waiting for the other country to agree
on an internationally coordinated policy.
4.3 Comparison of welfare costs of a unilateral foreign and
an internationally coordinated permit policy
Acknowledging that in a dynamically eﬃcient world economy for a net debtor coun-
try like the US the welfare costs of a unilateral domestic permit policy are higher
than the welfare costs of an internationally coordinated policy, the question remains
whether it would be beneﬁcial to agree on an internationally coordinated policy
instead of being aﬀected by the unilateral policy to be implemented by the other
country. In other words, is there an incentive for a country that has withdrawn
from the Kyoto Protocol to agree on an internationally coordinated strategy or is
she still better oﬀ by non–compliance? Proceeding similarly as before, we gain for
the domestic welfare costs of a foreign permit policy:
V (S,S
⋆ + dS





22Comparing (27) and (25), taking account of (22), leads to the following proposition
on the diﬀerence in the domestic welfare costs of a coordinated permit policy and a
foreign unilateral permit policy.
Proposition 4 Let αK = α⋆
K, αP = α⋆
P, ζ = (1 − ζ), S = S∗. Suppose that either
both countries implement a permit policy such that d¯ S = δdS, d ¯ S⋆ = (1 − δ)dS⋆,
where dS = dS⋆, 0 < δ < 1 and δ = 1/2 or Foreign implements a permit policy
dS⋆ < 0. The diﬀerence in domestic welfare costs of a coordinated permit policy and



























Depending on the signs of i and φ, three cases emerge:








< V (S,S⋆ +
dS⋆).








< V (S,S⋆ +
dS⋆).








− V (S,S⋆ +
dS⋆) is ambiguous.
Proof 4 See Proof to Proposition 3.
Under dynamic eﬃciency (the Golden Rule included) and irrespective of the external
balance of a country, the domestic welfare costs of unilateral foreign permit policy
are smaller than those of a internationally coordinated permit policy provided that
in case of a net foreign creditor the Golden Rule applies. While the other country
that is willing to implement a unilateral permit policy always gains in terms of
23welfare costs when Home agrees to a internationally coordinated policy too, Home
prefers non–acting to a harmonized policy (cases i and ii of Proposition 4). As
a consequence, the diverging positions towards climate policy result and are also
perpetuated.




2 ,S⋆ + dS⋆
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− V (S,S⋆ + dS⋆) is ambiguous. Eventually, the unilateral
policy by the other country might thus lead to higher domestic welfare losses than
a internationally coordinated policy.
4.4 Policy implications of welfare analysis for climate policy
In line with the domestic welfare eﬀects of unilateral ﬁscal policy (Persson, 1985,
p. 80), unilateral permit policy leads unambiguously to a domestic welfare loss if
the policy implementing country is a net foreign debtor and if the world economy
is dynamically eﬃcient. If on the other hand the world economy is dynamically
ineﬃcient, the eﬀect on welfare entails both positive and negative terms and hence
can either be in total a cost or a gain. Thus, based on domestic welfare costs, a
net debtor country is less likely to decide to implement a unilateral permit policy
than a net creditor country, and particularly so if the world economy is dynamically
eﬃcient. One policy conclusion from this result is that a permit policy entails, from
the perspective of the present domestic and foreign generation, a welfare loss in many
circumstances—a cost, which has to be balanced by global far–distant beneﬁts from
better environmental quality like slowed global warming.
Secondly, comparing the welfare costs of unilateral domestic permit policy and of
an internationally coordinated permit policy as speciﬁed above we ﬁnd that under
dynamic eﬃciency of the world economy the welfare costs of inﬁnitesimally small
and internationally coordinated climate policies are smaller than the welfare costs
of unilateral permit policy if the domestic country is a net foreign debtor. This is
24also true if the domestic country is a net foreign creditor and the world economy
ﬁnds itself in a Golden Rule situation. Hence, as a policy implication, net foreign
debtor countries under dynamic eﬃciency as well as net foreign creditor countries in
a Golden Rule will opt for international coordination of permit policy instead of a
unilateral domestic approach. When the economy switches from dynamic eﬃciency
(including the Golden Rule) to dynamic ineﬃciency, unilateralism might however
dominate (in terms of welfare costs) policy coordination.
Thirdly, for a net foreign debtor country under dynamic eﬃciency as well as for
net foreign creditor country in a Golden Rule, climate political inaction of the do-
mestic country is better (in terms of welfare) than agreeing on international policy
coordination. The reason in this case is not that there are no welfare costs for
the domestic country at all, but that it is cheaper bearing the welfare costs of for-
eign climate political actionism than agreeing on international policy coordination.
Hence, if the foreign country presses ahead with a unilateral permit policy, the best
response of the domestic country is to remain inactive. However, it is important to
acknowledge that this conclusion presupposes inﬁnitesimal permits reduction and
dynamic eﬃciency (including the Golden Rule). Under dynamic ineﬃciency, the
diﬀerence between the welfare costs of a unilateral and internationally coordinated
permit policy is in general ambiguous. For some feasible parameter values, the do-
mestic welfare costs of unilateral foreign policy might be higher than those of an
internationally coordinated policy.
Taken together, these results imply that whenever a unilateral policy leads to higher
domestic welfare costs when the policy is implemented domestically than abroad,
it is also true that an internationally coordinated policy causes higher welfare costs
than a unilateral policy by the other country. Consequently, if a country has a low
inclination to implement a national climate policy in the ﬁrst place, once the other
country has implemented a policy it is still better, in terms of welfare costs, to not
agree on an internationally coordinated policy.
255 Conclusion
This paper investigates the eﬀects of unilateral and internationally coordinated cli-
mate policies in a two–country, two–good OLG model. After deriving the intertem-
poral equilibrium dynamics of the terms of trade, Home’s and Foreign’s capital
intensities, we analyze the impact of a unilateral permit reduction on the steady
state of the key economic variables. We ﬁnd that the terms of trade of the pol-
icy implementing country improve while capital intensities in both countries fall
stronger in the policy implementing country than abroad.
While these steady state eﬀects of unilateral climate policy are independent of the
net foreign asset positions of the countries, domestic and foreign welfare show op-
posing eﬀects. While the terms of trade improvement is welfare enhancing for the
policy implementing country and welfare reducing for the other country, the fall in
capital intensities cause a declining net wage and an increasing interest rate. In
total, for the dynamically eﬃcient case, a permit reduction by a net debtor country
is associated with domestic and foreign welfare costs—and this gives an economic
explanation why climate policy has been implemented with large hesitation in the
past. Moreover, that welfare costs are higher for a net debtor country helps to better
understand why the US has withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol.
This leads to the question whether it is also in the own interest of a country to
abstain from unilateral permit policy or to opt–in on an internationally coordinated
permit policy that achieves an equal reduction target as each of the unilateral poli-
cies. Under dynamic eﬃciency, a net foreign debtor country reduces its welfare by
agreeing to an internationally coordinated permit policy relative to a unilateral for-
eign policy. The reason is that under international policy coordination with equal
reduction targets the terms of trade eﬀect vanishes and that the eﬀect on capital
intensities in both countries is less pronounced than of unilateral policies which leads
to ameliorated welfare costs. Surprisingly, this result also applies when the coun-
try under consideration is a net foreign creditor and the world economy stays in a
26Golden Rule situation.
Under dynamic ineﬃciency, however, independent of whether the permit reducing
country is a net foreign debtor or not, the welfare costs of a unilateral domestic
permit policy might be lower than of agreeing to an internationally coordinated
policy. This is also true when the foreign country has already, due to whatever
reason, reduced emission permits and the domestic country has to choose between
two options: remaining inactive by simply bearing the welfare costs of Foreign’s
climate political actionism might be more costly, in terms of welfare, than opting–in
on international policy coordination.
Under dynamic eﬃciency, however, our dynamic general equilibrium approach for
two large economies supplements the reasoning provided by static game game the-
ory and political economics why unilateral climate policy is not in the interest of
some highly developed countries even if other countries implement such a policy,
or in other words: internationally coordinated climate policies do not represent an
option for withdrawers from the Kyoto Protocol, particularly if they are net for-
eign debtors. This conclusion no longer pertains if the world economy becomes
dynamically ineﬃcient.
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A Appendix
A.1 Existence of steady states
This section is devoted to show how the existence of at least two non–trivial steady
state solutions of the intertemporal equilibrium dynamics (16)–(15) can be proven.
To this end, rewrite ﬁrst equations (17)–(19) as follows:
k
∗ = ˜ Sk





























k = ¯ F(k) + ∆(k). (31)
29whereby
¯ F(k) = (1 − ˜ αK)σ
(1 + i)
αK

















K and ϑ(k) ≡ ζb + (1 − ζ)b∗ k
k∗.
Next, consider the case of identical production technologies, i.e. αK = α∗
K. Clearly,
∆(k) = 0 and (31) reduces to
k = F(k) ≡ (1 − αK)σ
(1 + i)
αK
− ϑσ(1 + i) − ϑ(1 − σ),
with ϑ ≡ (ζb+(1−ζ)b∗˜ S−1). Proposition 1 from Farmer et al. (2008, 10–11), which
is reproduced as Lemma below, provides suﬃcient conditions for exactly two strictly
positive solutions of equation k = F(k).
Proposition 5 Let the parameter vector ω = (αK,αP,β,ζ,M,S,ϑ) be an element
of the parameter space Ω = [0,1]4 × R3
+. For any ω ∈ Ω there exists ϑ ∈ R++ such
that
1. for ϑ < ϑ there are one trivial (k = 0) and two non–trivial steady states kL
and kH with 0 < kL < kH < k,
2. for ϑ = ϑ there are one trivial and one non–trivial steady state, and
3. for ϑ > ϑ there is only the trivial steady state.
Proof 5 see Appendix A.1 in Farmer et al. (2008).
The next step is to prove the existence of at least two strictly positive solutions of
the equation k = ¯ F(k)+∆(k). The central insight here is that ¯ F(k)+∆(k) depends
continuously on α∗
K.
30Proposition 6 For every parameter set ω = (αK,α∗
K,αP,β,ζ,M,S,b,b∗) ∈ Ω =
[0,1]5×R4
+ with |αK −α∗
K| suﬃciently small some (non–unique) ¯ b,¯ b∗ > 0 exist such
that for all b ∈ (0,¯ b) and b∗ ∈ (0,¯ b∗) there are at least two non–trivial steady state
solutions (h,k,k∗).
Proof 6 For αK = α∗
K we know from Lemma 5 that for all ϑ < ¯ ϑ exactly two
solutions 0 < kL < kH of k = ¯ F(k) + ∆(k) occur. Since ¯ F(k) + ∆(k) depends
continuously on α∗, there is some interval Λ = (α−,α+) such that for all α∗
K ∈ Λ at
least two distinct solutions 0 < ˜ kL < ˜ kH exist8. ￿
A.2 Saddle–path stability of steady states
To prove the dynamic stability of a non–trivial steady state solution, we consider
the Jacobian of the dynamic system (16)–(15) in a small neighborhood around both
non–trivial steady state solutions. Again, we focus ﬁrst on the case of identical
production elasticities of capital. Proposition 2 from Farmer et al. (2008, 12) claims
that for ϑ < ¯ ϑ, at the lower steady state solution, kL, two eigenvalues of the Jacobian
are larger than one and one eigenvalue equals αK < 1, while at the larger steady
state solution of k = F(k) two eigenvalues are less than one and one eigenvalue is
larger than one. Hence, the lower steady state is saddle–path unstable while the
larger steady state is saddle–path stable.
In considering the general case αK  = α∗
K, we focus again at a suﬃciently small
diﬀerence between αK and α∗
K. Under this assumption, Proposition 2 of Farmer et
al. (2008, 12) can be generalized as the following Proposition 7.
Proposition 7 For every parameter set ω ∈ Ω with |αK − α∗
K| suﬃciently small
some (non–unique) ¯ b,¯ b∗ > 0 exist such that for all b ∈ (0,¯ b) and b∗ ∈ (0,¯ b∗) the
larger strictly positive solution of k = ¯ F(k) + ∆(k) is saddle–path stable.
8The analysis of ¯ F(k) + ∆(k) shows, however, that for αK < α∗
K a third steady state k > kH
exists.
31Proof 7 For αK = α∗
K, see the proof to Proposition 2 of Farmer et al. (2008, 29–
31). Again, since k = ¯ F(k) + ∆(k) depends continuously on α∗, there is some
interval Λ1 = (α1
−,α1
+) such that for all α∗
K ∈ Λ1 ⊂ Λ the larger solution kH of
k = ¯ F(k) + ∆(k) is saddle–path stable. ￿
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
To determine the eﬀects of a marginal unilateral reduction of emission permits on the
three dynamic variables, we totally diﬀerentiate (17), (18), and (19), with respect








































































































































































































































































































To show that dh/dS = −αPh/[S(1 − αK)], we proceed in two steps. First, we
show that αK = α∗
K and αP = α∗
P implies that dh/dk|GG = 0. From (33) we
know that dh/dk|GG = [−(1 − ζ)h∂H/∂k + ζ∂H∗/∂k∗∂k∗/∂k]/[(1 − ζ)H]. Ac-
knowledging the deﬁnition H = MSαPkαK − k, ∂H/∂k = 1 + i − 1 = i fol-
lows. Analogously, ∂H∗/∂k∗ = 1 + i∗ − 1 = i∗ holds, and hence dh/dk|GG =
[−(1 − ζ)hi + ζi∗ǫ(k∗/k)]/[(1 − ζ)H]. Since i∗ = i, ǫ = 1, k∗ = ˜ Sk and h =
ζ/(1 − ζ)˜ S, dh/dk|GG = 0 follows. Second, dh/dk|GG = 0 implies that dh/dS =
∂h/∂S|GG = [−(1 − ζ)h∂H/∂S + ζ∂H∗/∂k∗∂k∗/∂S]/[(1 − ζ)H]. Since ∂H/∂S =
αP/αK(1+i)k/S, and again using h = ζ/(1−ζ)˜ S, dh/dS = ∂h/∂S|GG = −αP/(1−
αK)h/S. Applying a similar argument to derive the other diﬀerentials, and ac-
knowledging that for αK = α∗
K and αP = α∗
P (17)–(19) reduce to k + ϑ(1 − σ) =
σ(1 + i)/αK [(1 − αK)k − αKϑ] brings forth the stated result. ￿
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
To derive (22)-(23), note that αK = α∗
K and αP = α∗
P implies that k + ϑ(1 − σ) =
σ(1+i)/(αK)[(1 − αK)k − αKϑ]. Furthermore, (w−τ) = (1 − αK)/αK(1+i)k−i b


























(w − τ − b + s).
To sign (22), acknowledge that dV/dS > 0 is certainly positive if φ > 0 and i ≥ 0.
If φ < 0 and i = 0 (Golden Rule), dV/dS > 0 if γφ+ζk/αK > 0. In all other cases,
both positive and negative terms prevail, and thus dV/dS is ambiguous. For (23), a
similar argument applies, the speciﬁc conditions are summarized in Proposition 2.￿
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